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Abstract: In the context of missions accomplished jointly by an artifical agent and a human
agent, we focus on a controller of the authority dynamics based on a dependence graph of
resources that can be controlled by both agents. The controller is designed to adapt the
behaviours of the artificial agent or of the human agent in case of an authority conflict occurring
on these resources. The relative authority of two agents regarding the control of a resource is
defined so as the authority conflict, which appears relevant to trigger authority reallocation
between agents as shown by a first experiment. Finally a second experiment shows that beyond
the modification of the artificial agent’s behaviour, it is also possible to adapt the human
operator’s behaviour in order to solve such a conflict.
Keywords: Adaptive autonomy, Authority sharing, human-robot interactions, Petri nets
1. INTRODUCTION
We consider an heterogeneous agent system in which a
robot (UGV, UAV 1 ) or a software agent (automatic pilot
in a plane) accomplishes a mission interacting with a hu-
man agent (operator, pilot). During the mission, agents are
given or take the authority Hardin and Goodrich (2009)
to use a resource, to perform a task, to satisfy a goal:
for instance, an aircraft automatic pilot in mode Vertical
Speed has the authority on the flight control surfaces in
order to reach a given altitude while guaranteeing some
flight performance; if the crew disconnect the automatic
pilot, then they take over the authority on the controls to
reach this goal. A change in authority allocation can be
planned in procedures or in the mission plan, or can be
unexpected: this happens when the human operator takes
over a task controlled by the artificial agent (software or
robot) because she detects a failure, or for any reason of
her own; or when the artificial agent takes over a task
controlled by the operator because the operator’s action
violates some constraints (collision with an obstacle, etc.),
or because communication with the operator is broken; or
when no agent has the authority anymore: for instance,
the automatic pilot has disconnected itself and the crew,
who is not flying, is not aware of that.
The challenge created by these unexpected changes in
authority allocation is that conflicts are likely to appear
within the system, due to the fact that either the plan
for both the human and artificial agents is not followed
anymore, or the operator has a wrong situation awareness
Wickens (2008), or both. This is illustrated by the follow-
ing experiment, conducted at Supaero-ISAE, on a target
search mission by a ground robot and a remote human
operator. During the mission, the operator must pilot
1 Unmanned Ground or Aerial Vehicle
the robot manually to identify targets, via her interface.
Whereas the operator takes over the robot for identifi-
cation, the robot starts returning to base, a procedure
triggered by the detection of a failing battery (unexpected
event simulated by a wizard of Oz interface 2 ). This event
is presented on the operator’s interface via three alarms:
the battery icon switches from green to orange, the piloting
mode blinks twice from ”manual” to ”supervised”, and
the display shows ”Return to base” in green. However this
unexpected event occurs at a critical time in the mission
when the operator is particularly focused on the identifi-
cation task in manual mode; therefore it is expected she
will not perceive this change of states and that both agents
(operator and robot) will persevere in pursuing their own
goal (identify the target or return to base, respectively).
Table 1 shows the eye-tracker results of 14 subjects 3 ,
analyzed with the Eye tech Lab software. The first column
is the participant’s identifier, the second one the conflict
duration, the third one whether the reason of the conflict
has been understood and the fourth one the seen alarms.
For instance, participant Dasje took 6 seconds to detect
and understand the conflict, he looked at least once at
the ”supervised” mode, the ”return to base” display and
the battery state. Participant Dupni did not understand
the conflict after 50 seconds, although her gaze went
on ”supervised” and on ”return to base”. However she
never looked at the state of the battery. The results of
this experiment are consistent with our hypotheses as the
authority conflict led 10 subjects out of 14 to persevere
in their target identification task, which was an error.
The analysis of the gaze behaviour of the 4 successful
participants reveals that these operators looked at least
at the couples (”battery state”, ”supervised” mode) or
2 allowing to trigger events without the operator being aware
3 subjects are equipped with a Pertech (25Hz) eye-tracker.
(”battery state”, ”return to base”) or even at the three
pieces of information. Finally, it is worth mentionning that
the robot sticked to its plan of returning to base, without
taking into account the conflict with the operator.
Subject
Conflict
duration (in s.)
Understanding Seen alarms
Dasje 6 yes
supervised,
return to base,
battery
Deffra 50 no supervised
Dupni 50 no
supervised,
return to base
Gatthi 50 no
supervised,
return to base
Guiju 50 no -
Guiny 50 no battery
Hosal 18 yes
return to base,
battery
Jacchi 50 no supervised
Nival 10 yes
supervised,
battery
Peich 29 no return to base
Penju 50 no supervised
Pense 35 yes
supervised,
battery
Rojan 50 no -
Schpa 50 no -
Table 1. Participants’behaviours during the
authority conflict
The work presented here aims at designing and implement-
ing an authority dynamics controller within the artificial
agent architecture, in order to: 1/ detect conflicts related
to an unexpected authority change; 2/ identify the con-
sequences of such conflicts on the mission; 3/ adapt the
agents’plans and if necessary, the authority allocation, in
order to ”accept” the authority change or on the contrary
to ”counter” it; the adaptation encompasses the sending
of information or guidance to the operator.
We suppose that the artificial agent is equipped with a
planning function (or a set of procedures) and a situation
assessment function (or state estimation). The authority
dynamics controller will be based on objective mission
elements (software and physical resources, tasks, goals,
constraints) which will be called resources. On top of
each resource we will define the authority of an agent
relatively to another agent. The state of these resources is
an abstraction of the system state provided by the siuation
assessment function. The mission plan (or procedure) is
extracted as a resource graph, where conflicts caused by an
unexpected authority change will appear. Conflict solving
will consist in modifying the resource graph via a plan
modification or an authority change between agents on a
resource subset.
2. AUTONOMY AND AUTHORITY
The literature is mainly focused on predefined autonomy
levels that are descriptive and not suited to real operations
of robots. Sheridan and Verplank (1978) first proposed a
classification for operational autonomy of a robot system
based on a ten-level scale. This model remains quite ab-
stract as it takes into account neither the environment
complexity nor the mission context. Other scales for auton-
omy classification have been proposed, e.g. Bradshaw et al.
(2003). Other approaches aim at evaluating the autonomy
of a robot in a given mission context, like MAP Hasslacher
and Tilden (1996) or ALFUS Huang et al. (2005). The
latter proposes to evaluate autonomy according to three
aspects: mission complexity, environmental difficulty and
human interface. However this methodology aggregates
many heterogeneous metrics and the meaning of the result
is hard to evaluate.
The main principle of these approaches is that machine
and human abilities are complementary and they are likely
to provide better performance when joined efficiently than
when used separately Kortenkamp et al. (1997). A robot
agent is thus capable of evolving at several predefined au-
tonomy levels and switches levels according to the context.
A level is defined by the complexity of the commands
Dorais et al. (1999) or the ability to perform tasks without
the need of operator’s interventions Goodrich et al. (2001).
The major limitations we can see in these approaches is the
a priori definition of the levels and the static distribution
of the tasks and interactions between the robot and the
operator at each level.
To add more flexibility, Goodrich et al. (2007) distinguish
between adjustable autonomy, where the operator chooses
the operating modes of the robot, and adaptive autonomy,
where the robot itself chooses its operating mode. Scerri
et al. (2003) endow robot agents with learning capabilities
allowing them to better manage the need for human inter-
vention. However this method does not seem to be directly
applicable to critical systems as the behaviour of learning
agents facing unexpected situations is hard to validate.
Moreover the operator’s interactions are restricted to the
needs of the robot agents. On a similar principle, Schurr
et al. (2009) build a model allowing artificial agents and
human operators to transfer decision making to each other
and compare their decisions. Inconsistencies in the team
can be detected in order to be solved. While the idea of
inconsistencies seems to be really relevant in the context of
a team of agents, the authors do not say how they should
be solved (who should have the priority if the artificial
agent and the human operator disagree?)
In contrast, collaborative control is an approach aiming
at creating dialogs between the operator and the robot
Fong et al. (2002): the robot sends requests to the hu-
man operator when problems occur so that they could
provide the needed support. This is again a restriction
of all possible interactions: only dialog is used whatever
the circumstances. In practice almost all interactions are
initiated by the robot and the operator acts almost ex-
clusively as a support. Sellner et al. (2006) base task
allocation between the robot and the operator on statistics
to determine which entity will be the most efficient. This
does not guarantee a success because statistics summarize
very different situations. However authority sharing at the
task level is an interesting idea as it provides the most
adaptive solution to the mission.
As shown by the literature review it is often interesting to
join human and machine abilities to carry out a mission
and adjustable autonomy seems a good principle. However
the fact that the human operator also is fallible is often ne-
glected. Moreover the simultaneous decisions and actions
of artificial and human agents are likely to create mis-
understandings and lead to conflicts Dehais et al. (2005).
Indeed, to our knowledge, control changes are not studied
under the perspective of the conflicts that they can create
between agents. As the experiment presented in introduc-
tion shows, as well as the study of aviation accident reports
Dehais et al. (2005), unexpected or misunderstood author-
ity changes can lead to inefficient, dangerous or catas-
trophic situations. In order to consider the human agent
and the artificial agent in the same way, we prefer to use
the concept of authority and authority control instead of
autonomy, which concerns the artificial agent exclusively.
The authority dynamics controller that we present aims
at detecting and solving authority conflicts, taking into
account the following different requirements about control:
the initiative can be given to the artificial agent, to the
operator, or to both agents; the granularity of authority
objects must be appropriate, for detecting and solving
conflicts. Moreover there is a need for an objective and
application-independent criterion of authority evolution.
Finally, models of the operator’s tasks and ”state” should
be incorporated into the artificial agent’s knowledge, as
well as the operator’s inputs (from ”low level” orders to
”high level” orders).
3. RESOURCES AND AUTHORITY
3.1 Resources
An authority conflict appears as an inconsistency in an
agent’s plan (for instance a constraint is not respected),
or as an interference between several agents’plans (for
instance, the use of the same non-shareable resource at
the same time). In order to possibly reallocate authority
between agents, the conflict must be evaluated: the in-
volved agents must be identified, as well as the violated
constraints or the part of the plan that is impaired. The
authority dynamics controller will be based on a represen-
tation of the agents current plans, i.e. which tasks they
perform, which means they need, which constraints they
must respect to satisfy their goals. Therefore we represent
an agent’s plan as a dependency graph. We suppose that
the artificial agent (that will embed the authority dynam-
ics controller) has planning abilities. A dependency graph
is obtained from the abstraction of a plan generated by an
automated planner (e.g. an HTN planner - Hierarchical
Task Network - like JSHOP2 Nau et al. (2001)). Depen-
dencies are extracted from the planning operators, as they
can be linked to each other by matching their instanciated
preconditions and effects.
Definition: the dependency graph resulting from the ab-
straction of a plan is a graph whose nodes are resources
and arcs represent the precondition relationship ”A needs
B” between resources. Therefore a resource represent a
physical element of the system (sensor, energy, etc.) or a
symbolic element (piece of information, task, goal, con-
straint, operator’s input, etc). A leaf-node is a goal. Such
a dependency graph will be referred to as resource graph.
This is a dynamic graph that will be updated according to
the updates of the plan during the mission. In our formal
model based on Petri nets, resources are represented using
a single generic net, encompassing a resource states and
static properties. As dependency arcs can also have dif-
ferent properties, we represent them using another generic
Petri net that we call interface, see Mercier et al. (2009).
Example: in order to produce the goal ”Reach WP-Goal”,
the planning operator NavigationRobot is instanciated
with the parameterWP-Goal as the destination and robot
as the performing agent. We thus obtain the resource
graph shown on figure 1, with WP-Goal as the goal,
Navigation Robot as the instanciated task and the energy,
position, steering wheel and safety distance as the precon-
ditions. We notice that if one of the resources vanishes
during the execution due to an unexpected event, the
depending resources will be affected too.
Fig. 1. Resource graph to reach goal WP-Goal
3.2 Authority
Definition: the authority of an agent 푋 on a resource
푅 relatively to another agent 푌 is defined through the
following properties:
∙ the access right is the capacity of agent to 푋 include
a resource 푅 in a resource graph, that is to control 푅
in order to reach a goal;
∙ the preemptability right: for a ”non shareable” re-
source, though 푋 has access to 푅, it can be controlled
by 푌 . The preemptability right gives agent 푋 the
right to use 푅 as soon as needed, taking it from agent
푌 if necessary;
∙ the control guarantee right: once agent 푋 controls
푅 (i.e. 푋 has accessed the resource), 푋 may lose it
to the benefit of 푌 through preemption. The control
guarantee allows agent 푋 to be certain that agent 푌
will not be able to take 푅 away from it.
Therefore the authority of an agent on a resource is
characterized by:
∙ a gradation of the agent’s authority: agent푋’s control
on resource 푅 gets stronger as it is granted with the
access right, the preemptability right and the control
guarantee right, in this order.
∙ authority, as autonomy Castelfranchi and Falcone
(2003) is a relative concept: for instance, for a given
resource 푅, agent 푋 may have the preemption right
over agent 푌 , but not over agent 푍. Consequently
there are as many authority relationships as there are
couples of agents that may control the resource.
∙ authority is shared between the agents: for a couple
of agents < 푋,푌 > that may control resource 푅, the
authority gain of agent 푋 on resource 푅 corresponds
to an authority loss for agent 푌 . For instance, if agent
푋 obtains the control guarantee on 푅, this means
agent 푌 loses preemptability. Consequently if agent
푋 gets exclusivity rights on 푅, agent 푌 will not have
access to 푅 anymore : agent 푋 prevents agent 푌 to
access resource 푅, even if it does not use it.
Fig. 2. Authority relationship between two agents 푋 and
푌 on a given resource 푅: Petri net AR(X,Y).
The Petri net AR(X,Y) in figure 2 represents the authority
relationship between two agents 푋 et 푌 for a given
resource 푅. Each place corresponds to the state of access,
preemptability and control guarantee for both agents 푋
and 푌 regarding resource 푅. The state changes modify
the behaviour of 푅, i.e. it determines whether 푅 can be
allocated to 푋 or 푌 , or not.
Agent Authority Access Preemption Guarantee
X No Access No - -
Y Preemptability Yes Anytime Yes
X Access Yes Waiting No
Y Preemptability Yes Anytime Yes
X Preemptability Yes Anytime No
Y Preemptability Yes Anytime No
X Access Yes Waiting Yes
Y Access Yes Waiting Yes
Table 2. Properties of relative authority be-
tween agents 푋 and 푌 for resource 푅
In Table 2, each double line gives, for each agent 푋 and
푌 , its authority on resource 푅 and the status of the three
associated properties. There are two intermediate states
for which the authority of the agents is equivalent, (Access
/ Access) and (Preemptability / Preemptability). As far
as the first one is concerned, the agents cannot take the
resource from one another, each one must wait for the
other one to relax the resource. This is a cooperation
context. As far as the second one is concerned the agents
can take the resource control from one another indefinitely,
which makes the behaviour of the system unefficient or
even dangerous. This is a competition context.
4. CONFLICTS ON RESOURCES
4.1 Definitions
During the mission execution, discrepancies may appear
between the plan and the observed facts. They may come
from hazards occurring in the environment, failures or
unplanned actions of the agents. They appear in the re-
source graph, as it is an abstraction of the nominal plan:
one or several resources within the graph are put into
an inconsistent state. The inconsistency for a resource is
defined as a non-desired marking in the resource Petri net
model. A non-desired marking can appear on any resource
of the model. As resources are all represented by the same
Petri net, it is only necessary to study the reachable mark-
ings of this net, according to its inital marking (i.e. the
resource properties). A reachable marking results either
from a nominal event sequence, or from an unexpected
event sequence, the latter being undesired.
Definition: a conflict on a resource 푅 is a non-desired
reachable marking of the Petri net representing 푅. There
are two types of conflicts:
∙ There is a ConflictDestruction when 푅 is in state
Absent while it is Allocated. It corresponds to a faulty
hardware, a software error or a task failure, depending
on what the resource represents.
∙ There is a ConflictPreemption when 푅 is a non-
shareable resource and has two simultaneous users.
It follows the action of an agent who is requiring 푅,
which is already used by another agent.
Example: the robot performs its navigation task to reach
WP-arrival. The operator unexpectedly decides to take
manual control of the robot trajectory via her joystick for
heading control. The human agent’s action modifies the
resource graph, as shown on figure 3. The request is asso-
ciated with the fact that the operator wants to perform a
manual navigation task, whose arrival point is only known
by the operator. Resource Steering Wheel that was al-
ready allocated to resource Navigation Robot via interface
int3, is preemptable and requested by resource Navigation
Operator via another interface: resource Steering Wheel
is allocated via interface int8. Resource Steering Wheel
is then simultaneously allocated to resources Navigation
Robot and Navigation Operator, which is inconsistent as
Steering Wheel is a ”non shareable” resource. This is a
ConflictPreemption. The resource graph of figure 3 explicitly
represents the state of knowledge of the robot agent after
the human agent’s action.
Fig. 3. resource graph after insertion of detected human
operator’s action, conflict
4.2 Authority conflict solving
Solving without authority change We have seen that
there are two types of conflict: ConflictDestruction and
ConflictPreemption, which correspond to undesired reach-
able markings within one or several resources in the re-
source graph. The role of the authority dynamics con-
troller, which is part of the robot agent, is to detect
conflicts then to restore back the consistency within the
resource graph:
∙ Conflict detection: an undesired marking is detected
within 푅 Petri net.
∙ Request to the planner: triggered by the authority
dynamics controller. A new plan is searched to re-
store consistency by reallocating resources between
agents, while keeping the existing goals. However
some parts of the plan may be imposed, depending
on the agents’actions that cannot be modified: the
search space is constrained by the actions achievable
by the agents as well as the authority relationships
between agents on resources. The interaction with the
human operator is one of the actions available to the
artificial agent in order to restore the consistency of
the resource(s) involved in the conflict.
∙ If a solving plan is found, this means that dependency
arcs (interfaces) need to be deleted or created to
update the resource graph. The existing authority
relationships remain unchanged.
Example: on the example on figure 3, a preemption con-
flict has occurred on resource Steering Wheel. Resources
Navigation Robot and Navigation Operator are competing
for the control of resource Steering Wheel which is ”non-
shareable”. ASteeringWheel(r, h) represents the authority
relationship between the robot agent 푟 and the human
operator ℎ on SteeringWheel (see figure 2). This authority
relationship is such that the robot has Access to Steering
Wheel and the human can Preempt Steering Wheel, so the
interface created by the operator gets the priority over the
interface created by the robot. However replanning must
be triggered, as the robot agent’s plan is now unfeasable:
a plan satisfying both goals WP-Operator and WP-Goal
is searched, the abstraction of which contains resource
Navigation Operator.
Authority sharing dynamics If no solving plan is found
without authority change, planning requires the modifi-
cation of some authority relationships in order to release
some constraints and increase the size of its search space:
transitions Ag r gain, Ag r loss, Ag h gain and Ag h
loss on relationships AR(r, h) can be fired, 푅 being one
of the conflicting resource or any other available resource
allowing to create a solving plan. In case no solving plan is
found within this enlarged search space, the planner must
generate a downgraded plan, inducing the loss of one or
several goals.
Example: While the human operator is controlling the
manual navigation task (resource Navigation Operator),
she violates the safety distance constraint, destroying re-
source SafetyDistance. There is a ConflictDestruction within
resource SafetyDistance. A solving plan consists in ur-
gently giving back the navigation control to the robot
agent: transitions Ag r gain then Ag h loss are succes-
sively fired within ASteeringWheel(r, h), in order to give
Preemptability to the robot: the robot agent has gained
authority temporarily over the human operator for re-
source SteeringWheel. This makes it possible to allocate
resource Steering Wheel to resource EmergencyNavRobot
to produce resource SafetyDistance which became a goal.
5. EXPERIMENTS
The experiment described in the introduction is considered
again (same experimental setup, same scenario), using
the authority dynamics controller. This second experiment
was conducted with 12 subjects. The goal was to test
empirically one of the actions available to the authority
dynamics controller to restore consistency in case of a con-
flict, using a planned interaction with the operator. Based
on a simplified model of the operator’s situation awareness
(her gaze behaviour), the artificial agent attempts to solve
the conflict by modifying the operator’s behaviour instead
of its own. As the human operator is persevering into
her task, the robot agent uses an interaction procedure
to change the information presented to the operator to
get her out of her task. Figure 4 shows the resource graph
corresponding to the robot returning to base while making
the operator understand the robot’s behaviour.
The artificial agent has two distinct simultaneous goals
WP-Base and SA Operator, which explains that the re-
source graph is not connected. The resource subgraph for
goal WP-Base involves task Navigation Robot controlling
SteeringWheel, which in turn implies that the robot has
preempted SteeringWheel from the operator. The second
goal SA Operator means that the artificial agent aims
at getting the human operator out of her perseveration
by informing her about the conflict (ConflictDestruction on
resource Energy) and about the plan generated to solve
this conflict; the operator has to recover her situation
awareness. Therefore this resource graph contains an in-
teraction task SendSACounterMeasure, which is a cogni-
tive counter-measure Dehais et al. (2003) based on the
conflict information Info:ConflictOnEnergy and plan in-
formation Info:NewPlanGoToWP-Base. The eye-tracking
data showed that these pieces of information had not been
seen. The cognitive counter-measure consists in removing
the panoramic vision display where the operator is focused,
and to replace it during 4 seconds with the message ”Bat-
tery failure, robot returning to base”.
Fig. 4. Resource graph associated with the conflict solving
Table 3 summarizes the second experiment results. The
first column indicates the subject id, the second one
the conflict duration after sending the counter-measure
and the third one details if all three alarms have been
looked at least once since counter-measure sending. For
example, participant Pouch immediately perceived and
understood the conflict after counter-measure sending;
and the counter-measure led him to look at least once
at the three alarms. Participant Garu perceived all the
relevant information but it took him 26 seconds to release
complete control to the robot. The result analysis shows
that this concept of interaction with the human operator,
triggered by the authority dynamics controller, is efficient:
10 participants out of 12 gave immediately the control back
to the robot to let it return to base automatically. The two
remaining participants said that they had perceived the
conflict with the counter-measure but thought they had
time before the battery would be totally discharged.
Subjet
conflict
duration (in s.)
Seen alarms
Pouch 0 supervised, return to base, battery
Gargu 26 supervised, return to base, battery
Lesc 0 supervised, return to base, battery
Berdo 0 supervised, return to base, battery
Thola 0 supervised, return to base, battery
Lasni 0 supervised, return to base, battery
Gabje 0 supervised, return to base, battery
Jacra 0 supervised, return to base, battery
Magma 0 supervised, return to base, battery
Rogma 50 supervised, return to base, battery
Treau 0 supervised, return to base, battery
Herma 0 supervised, return to base, battery
Table 3. Results with counter-measure sent by
the authority dynamics controller
6. CONCLUSION
In the context of a mission operated jointly by an artificial
agent and a human agent, we have presented an authority
dynamics controller, based on a dependency graph be-
tween resources that can be controlled by the two agents.
It is aimed at adapting the artificial agent or the human
agent’s behaviour in case of authority conflict on these
resources. We have defined the relative authority between
two agents relatively to a given resource through the
properties of access, preemption, and control guarantee.
The authority of an agent over a resource can thus change
during the mission, in order to adjust its behaviour to
the other agent’s behaviour. Future experiments should
allow us to study more precisely the criteria to justify
an autority loss or gain for an agent over one or several
resources, which we call meta-authority. The experimental
aspect will be crucial because allowing an artificial agent
to take over resources controlled by a human agent brings
a lot of new challenges: agents’cohesion, communication
and support of the human operator’situation awareness,
operator’s acceptance. Solutions allowing to influence the
operator’s actions without disturbing her (e.g. ”sublimi-
nal” guidance, actions on the operator’s situation aware-
ness using counter-measures, etc.) must be developed.
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